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For certain tasks, AI systems have achieved good enough performance to be deployed in our 
streets and our homes.  Object recognition helps modern cars see.  Speech recognition helps 
personalized voice assistants, such as Siri and Alexa, converse.  For other tasks, AI systems have 
even exceeded human performance.  AlphaGo was the first computer program to beat the best 
Go player in the world. 
 
The promise of AI is huge.  They will drive our cars.  They will help doctors diagnose disease 
more accurately [Tiwari et al. 2016].  They will help judges make more consistent court 
decisions.  They will help employers hire more suitable job candidates. 
We know, however, these AI systems can be brittle and unfair.  Adding graffiti to a stop sign 
fools the classifier into saying it is not a stop sign [Eykholt et al. 2017].  Adding noise to an 
image of a benign skin lesion fools the classifier into saying it is malignant [Finlayson et al 
2019].  Risk assessment tools used in US courts have shown to be biased against blacks [Angwin 
et al. 2016].  Corporate recruiting tools have been shown to be biased against women [Dastin 
2018]. 
 
How then can we deliver on the promise of the benefits of AI but address these scenarios that 
have life-critical consequences for people and society?  In short, how can we achieve trustworthy 
AI? 
 
1. From Trustworthy Computing to Trustworthy AI 
 
The landmark Trust in Cyberspace 1999 National Academies report lay the foundations of 
trustworthy computing and what continues to be an active research area [NRC 1999]. 
 
The National Science Foundation started a series of programs on trust.  Starting with Trusted 
Computing (initiated in 2001), then Cyber Trust (2004), then Trustworthy Computing (2007), 
and now Secure and Trustworthy Systems (2011), the Computer and Information Science and 
Engineering Directorate has grown the academic research community in trustworthy computing.  
Although it started within the computer science community, support for research in trustworthy 
computing now spans multiple directorates at NSF and engages many other funding 
organizations, including, through the Networking and Information Technology Research and 
Development (NITRD) Program, 20 federal agencies. 
 
Industry has also been a leader and active participant in trustworthy computing.  With Bill 
Gates’s January 2002 “Trustworthy Computing” memo [Gates 2002], Microsoft signaled to its 
employees, customers, shareholders, and the rest of the information technology sector the 
importance of trustworthy software and hardware products.  It referred to an internal Microsoft 
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white paper, which identified four pillars to trustworthiness: security, privacy, reliability, and 
business integrity.  The first three properties were aimed at the customer, to give the customer 
good reason to trust Microsoft software and services. 
 
After two decades of investment and advances in research and development, trustworthy has 
come to mean a set of (overlapping) properties: 
 
• Reliability: Does the system do the right thing? 
• Safety: Does the system do no harm? 
• Security: How vulnerable is the system to attack? 
• Privacy: Does the system protect a person’s identity and data? 
• Availability: Is the system up when I need to access it? 
• Usability: Can a human use it easily? 
 
The computing systems for which we want such properties to hold are hardware and software 
systems, including their interaction with the humans and the physical world.  As technology 
advances and as adversaries get more sophisticated, trustworthy computing remains a holy grail. 
 
AI systems raise the bar in terms of the set of properties of interest.  In addition to the properties 
associated with trustworthy computing (from above), we also want (overlapping) properties such 
as: 
 
• Accuracy: How well does the AI system do on new (unseen) data compared to data on 
which it was trained and tested? 
• Robustness: How sensitive is the system’s outcome to a change in the input? 
• Fairness: Are the system outcomes unbiased? 
• Accountability: Who or what is responsible for the system’s outcome? 
• Transparency: Is it clear to an external observer how the system’s outcome was 
produced? 
• Interpretability/Explainability: Can the system’s outcome be justified with an explanation 
that a human can understand and/or that is meaningful to the end user? 
• Ethical: Was the data collected in an ethical manner? Will the system’s outcome be used 
in an ethical manner? 
• …and others, yet to be identified 
 
The machine learning community considers accuracy as a gold standard, but trustworthy AI 
requires us to explore tradeoffs among these properties.  For example, perhaps we are willing to 
give up on some accuracy in order to deploy a fairer model.  Also, some of the above properties 
may have different interpretations, leading to different formalizations.  For example, there are 
many reasonable notions of fairness [Narayanan 2018], e.g., group fairness (statistical parity) and 
individual fairness [Dwork et al. 2012], some of which are incompatible with each other 
[Chouldechova 2016, Kleinberg, Mullainathan, and Raghavan 2017].  
 
Traditional software and hardware systems are complex due to their size and the number of 
interactions among their components.  For the most part, we can define their behavior in terms of 
discrete logic and as deterministic state machines. 
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Today’s AI systems, especially those using deep neural networks, add a dimension of complexity 
to traditional computing systems. This complexity is due to their inherent probabilistic nature.  
Through probabilities, AI systems model the uncertainty of human behavior and the uncertainty 
of the physical world.  More recent advances in machine learning, which rely on big data, add to 
their probabilistic nature, as data from the real world are just points in a probability space.  Thus, 
trustworthy AI necessarily directs our attention from the primarily deterministic nature of 
traditional computing systems to the probabilistic nature of AI systems.  
 
2. Verify, to Trust 
 
How can we design, implement, and deploy AI systems to be trustworthy? 
 
One approach for building end-user trust in computing systems is formal verification, where 
properties are proven once and for all over a large domain, e.g., for all inputs to a program or for 
all behaviors of a concurrent or distributed system. Alternatively, the verification process 
identifies a counterexample, e.g., an input value where the program produces the wrong output or 
a behavior that fails to satisfy the desired property, and thus provides valuable feedback on how 
to improve the system. Formal verification has the advantage of obviating the need to test 
individual input values or behaviors one-by-one, which for large (or infinite) state spaces is 
impossible to achieve completely. These approaches are now used in the hardware and software 
industry, e.g., Intel [Harrison 2003], IBM [Baumbartner 2006], Microsoft [Ball et al. 2004], and 
Amazon [Newcombe et al. 2015].  Due to advances in formal methods languages, algorithms, 
and tools, and to the increased scale and complexity of hardware and software, we have seen in 
the past few years a new surge of interest and excitement in formal verification, especially for 
ensuring the correctness of critical components of system infrastructure [Bhargavan et al. 2017, 
Chen et al. 2015, Chen et al. 2017, Gu et al. 2016, Hawblitzel et al. 2014,   Koh et al. 2019, 
Protzenko et al. 2017]. 
 
Formal verification is a way to provide provable guarantees and thus increase one’s trust that the 
system will behave as desired. 
 
2.1. From Traditional Formal Methods to Formal Methods for AI 
 
In traditional formal methods, we want to show that a model M satisfies (⊨) a property P. 
 
M ⊨ P 
 
M is the object to be verified—be it a program or an abstract model of a complex system, e.g., a 
concurrent, distributed, or reactive system.  P is the correctness property, expressed in some 
discrete logic.  For example, M might be a concurrent program that uses locks for 
synchronization and P might be “deadlock free.”  A proof that M is deadlock free means any user 
of M is assured that M will never reach a deadlocked state.  To prove that M satisfies P, we use 
formal mathematical logics, which are the basis of today’s scalable and practical verification 
tools such as model checkers and satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) solvers. 
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Especially when M is a concurrent, distributed, or reactive system, in traditional formal methods, 
we often add explicitly a specification of a system’s environment E in the formulation of the 
verification task: 
 
E, M ⊨ P 
 
For example, if M is a parallel process, E might be another process with which M interacts (and 
then we might write E ∥ M ⊨ P).  Or, if M is device driver code, E might be a model of the 
operating system.  Or, if M is a control system, E might be a model of its environment that closes 
the control loop.  The specification of E is written to make explicit the assumptions about the 
environment in which the system is to be verified. 
 
For verifying AI systems, M could be interpreted to be a complex system, e.g., a self-driving car, 
which has a component within it that is a machine-learned model, e.g., a computer vision system.  
Here, we would want to prove P, e.g., safety or robustness, with respect to M (the car) in the 
context of E (traffic, roads, pedestrians, buildings, and so on).  We can view proving P as proving 
a “system-level” property.  Seshia et al. elaborate on the formal specification challenges with this 
perspective [Seshia et al. 2018], where a deep neural network might be a component of the 
system M. 
 
But what can we assert about the machine learned model, e.g., the DNN, that is a critical 
component of this system?  Is there a robustness or fairness property we can verify of the 
machine-learned model itself?  Answering these questions raises new verification challenges. 
 
2.2. Verifying a Machine-Learned Model M 
 
For verifying an ML model, we reinterpret M and P:  M stands for a machine-learned model.  P 
stands for a trustworthy property, e.g., safety, robustness, privacy, or fairness.   
 
Verifying AI systems ups the ante over traditional formal methods. There are two key 
differences: 
 
1. The inherent probabilistic nature of M and P, and thus the need for probabilistic reasoning 
(⊨). 
 
• The ML model, M, itself is semantically and structurally different from a typical 
computer program.  As mentioned, it is inherently probabilistic, taking inputs from the 
real world, that are perhaps mathematically modeled as a stochastic process, and 
producing outputs that are associated with probabilities.  Internally, the model itself 
operates over probabilities; for example, labels on edges in a deep neural network are 
probabilities and nodes compute functions over these probabilities.  Structurally, because 
a machine generated the ML model, M itself is not necessarily something human readable 
or comprehensible; crudely, a DNN is a complex structure of if-then-else statements that 
would unlikely ever be written by a human.  This “intermediate code” representation 
opens up new lines of research in program analysis. 
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• The properties P themselves may be formulated over continuous, not (just) discrete 
domains, and/or using expressions from probability and statistics.  Robustness properties 
for deep neural networks are characterized as predicates over continuous variables 
[Dreossi et al. 2019].  Fairness properties are characterized in terms of expectations with 
respect to a loss function over reals (e.g., see [Dwork et al. 2012]).  Differential privacy is 
defined in terms of a difference in probabilities with respect to a (small) real value 
[Dwork et al. 2006].  Note that just as with properties such as usability for trustworthy 
computing, some desired properties of trustworthy AI systems, e.g., transparency or 
ethics, have yet to be formalized or may not be formalizable.  Thus, verification of AI 
systems will be limited to what can be formalized. 
 
• These inherently probabilistic models M and associated desired trust properties P call for 
scalable and/or new verification techniques that work over reals, non-linear functions, 
probability distributions, stochastic processes, and so on.  Thus, one stepping stone to 
verifying AI systems is probabilistic logics and hybrid logics, used by the cyber-physical 
systems community.   Even more challenging is that these verification techniques need to 
operate over machine-generated code, in particular code that itself might not be produced 
deterministically.1 
 
2. The role of data 
 
Perhaps the more significant key difference between traditional formal verification and 
verification for AI systems is the role of data—data used in training, testing, and deploying ML 
models.  Today’s ML models are built and used with respect to a set, D, of data.  For verifying an 
ML model, we propose to make explicit the assumptions about this data, and formulate the 
verification problem as: 
 
D, M ⊨ P 
 
Data is divided into available data and unseen data, where available data is data-at-hand, used 
for training and testing M; and unseen data is data over which M needs (or is expected) to 
operate without having seen it before.  The whole idea behind building M is so that based on the 
data on which it was trained and tested, M would be able to make predictions on data it has never 
seen before, typically to some degree of accuracy.   
 
Making the role of data explicit raises novel specification and verification questions, roughly 
broken into these categories: 
 
Collection and partitioning of available data 
 
• How do we partition an available (given) dataset into a training set and a test set?  What 
guarantees can we make of this partition with respect to a desired property P, in building 
a model M? 
                                                            
1 The ways in which machine learning models, some with millions of parameters, are constructed today, perhaps 
through weeks of training on clusters of CPUs, TPUs, and GPUs, raise a meta-issue of trust: scientific 
reproducibility. 
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• How much data suffices to build a model M for a given property P?  Does adding more 
data to train or test M make it more robust, fairer, etc. or does it not have an effect with 
respect to the property P?  What new kind of data needs to be collected if a desired 
property does not hold? 
 
Specifying unseen data 
 
• How do we specify the data and/or characterize properties of the data?  For example, we 
could specify D as a stochastic process that generates inputs over which the ML model 
needs to be verified.  Or, we could specify D as a data distribution.  For a common 
statistical model, e.g., a normal distribution, we could specify D in terms of its 
parameters, e.g., mean and variance.  Probabilistic programming languages, e.g., Stan 
[Carpenter et al. 2017], might be a starting point for specifying statistical models.  But 
what of large real-world datasets that do not fit common statistical models or which have 
thousands of parameters?  
• In specifying unseen data, by definition, we will need to make certain assumptions about 
the unseen data.  Would these assumptions not then be the same as those we would make 
to build the model M in the first place?  More to the point: How can we trust the 
specification of D?  This seemingly logical deadlock is analogous to the problem in 
traditional verification, where given an M, we need to assume that the specifications of 
the elements E and P are “correct” in the verification task E, M ⊨ P.  Then in the 
verification process, we may need to modify E and/or P (or even M).  To break the 
circular reasoning at hand, one approach is to use a different validation approach for 
checking the specification of D; such approaches could borrow from a repertoire of 
statistical tools (see Section 2.3).  Another approach would be to assume that an initial 
specification is small or simple enough that it can be checked by (say, manual) 
inspection; then we use this specification to bootstrap an iterative refinement process.  
(We draw inspiration from the counter-example guided abstraction and refinement 
method [Clarke et al. 2000] of formal methods.)  This refinement process may necessitate 
modifying D, M, and/or P. 
• How does the specification of unseen data relate to the specification of the data on which 
M was trained and tested? 
 
In traditional verification, we aim to prove property, P, a universally quantified statement: for 
example, for all input values of integer variable x, the program will return a positive integer; or 
for all execution sequences x, the system will not deadlock. 
 
So the first question for proving P of an ML model, M, is: in P, what do we quantify over?  For 
an ML model that is to be deployed in the real world, one reasonable answer is to quantify over 
data distributions.  But a ML model is meant to work only for certain distributions that are 
formed by real world phenomena, and not for arbitrary distributions.  We do not want to prove a 
property for all data distributions.  This insight on the difference in what we quantify over and 
what the data represents for proving a trust property for M leads to novel specification questions: 
 
• How can we specify the class of distributions over which P should hold for a given M?  
Consider robustness and fairness as two examples: 
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o For robustness, in the adversarial machine learning setting, we might want to show 
that M is robust to all norm-bounded perturbations D.  More interestingly, we might 
want to show M is robust to all “semantic” or “structural” perturbations for the task at 
hand.  For example, for some vision tasks, we want to consider rotating or darkening 
an image, not just changing any old pixel. 
o For fairness, we might want to show the ML model is fair on a given dataset and all 
unseen datasets that are “similar” (for some formal notion of “similar”).  Training a 
recruiting tool to decide whom to interview on one population of applicants should 
ideally be fair on any future population.  How can we specify these related 
distributions? 
 
Verification task 
 
• How do we check the available data for desired properties?  For example, if we want to 
detect whether a dataset is fair or not, what should we be checking about the dataset? 
• If we detect that the property does not hold, how do we fix the model, amend the 
property, or decide what new data to collect for retraining the model?  What is the 
equivalent of a “counterexample” in the verification of an ML model and how do we use 
it? 
• How do we exploit the explicit specification of unseen data to aid in the verification task? 
• How can we extend standard verification techniques to operate over data distributions, 
perhaps taking advantage of the ways in which we formally specify unseen data? 
 
These two key differences—inherent probabilistic nature of M and the role of data D—provide 
research opportunities for the formal methods community to advance specification and 
verification techniques for AI systems. 
 
2.3. Additional Formal Methods Opportunities 
 
Today’s AI systems are developed with in mind to perform a particular task, e.g., face 
recognition or playing Go.  How do we take into consideration the task that the deployed ML 
model is to perform in the specification and verification problem?  For example, consider 
showing the robustness of a ML model, M, that does object recognition: For the task of 
identifying cars on the road, we would want M to be robust to the image of any car that has a 
dent in its side; but for the task of quality control in an automobile manufacturing line, we would 
not. 
 
Section 2.2 focused on the verification task in formal methods.  But the machinery of formal 
methods has also successfully been used recently for program synthesis [Gulwani, Polozov, and 
Singh 2017].  Rather than post-facto verification of a model M, can we develop a “correct-by-
construction” approach in building M in the first place?  For example, could we add the desired 
trustworthy property, P, as a constraint as we train and test M, with the intention of guaranteeing 
that P holds (perhaps for a given dataset or for a class of distributions) at deployment time? 
 
Compositional reasoning enables us to do verification on large and complex systems.  How does 
verifying a component of an AI system for a property “lift” to showing that property holds for 
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the system?  Conversely, how does one decompose an AI system into pieces, verify each with 
respect to a given property, and assert the property holds of the whole?  Which properties are 
global (elude compositionality) and which are local?  Decades of research in formal methods for 
compositional specification and verification give us a vocabulary and framework as a good 
starting point. 
 
Statistics has a rich history in model checking2 and model evaluation, using tools such as 
sensitivity analysis, prediction scoring, predictive checking, residual analysis, and model 
criticism.  With the goal of validating an ML model satisfies a desired property, these statistical 
approaches can complement formal verification approaches, just as testing and simulation 
complement verification of computational systems.  Even more relevantly, as mentioned in “The 
role of data” in Section 2.2, they can help with the evaluation of any statistical model used to 
specify unseen data, D, in the D, M ⊨ P problem.  An opportunity for the formal methods 
community is to combine these statistical techniques with traditional verification techniques (for 
early work on such a combination, see [Younes and Simmons 2002]). 
 
3. Promoting Trustworthy AI 
 
Just as for trustworthy computing, formal methods is only one approach toward ensuring 
increased trust in AI systems.  The community needs to explore many approaches to achieve 
trustworthy AI.  Moreover, besides technical challenges, there are societal, policy, legal, and 
ethical challenges. 
 
On October 30-November, 2020, Columbia University’s Data Science Institute hosted an 
inaugural symposium on Trustworthy AI, sponsored by Capital One, a DSI industry affiliate. It 
brought together researchers from formal methods, security and privacy, fairness, and machine 
learning.  Speakers from industry brought a reality check to the kinds of questions and 
approaches the academic community are pursuing.   The participants identified research 
challenge areas, including: 
 
• specification and verification techniques 
•  “correctness-by-construction” techniques 
• new threat models and system-level adversarial attacks 
• auditing processes that consider properties such as explainability, transparency, and 
responsibility 
• ways to detect bias and de-bias data, machine learning algorithms, and their outputs 
• systems infrastructure for experimenting for trustworthiness properties 
• understanding the human element, e.g., where the machine is influencing human behavior 
• understanding the societal element, including social welfare, social norms, morality, 
ethics, and law. 
 
                                                            
2 Not to be confused with computer science’s notion of model checking, where a finite state machine (computational 
model of a system) is checked against a given property specification [Clarke and Emerson 1980, Queille and Sifakis 
1982]. 
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In October 2019, the National Science Foundation announced a new program to fund National 
AI Institutes.  One of the six themes is names “Trustworthy AI.”  It emphasizes properties such 
as reliability, explainability, privacy, and fairness. 
 
Just as for trustworthy computing, government, academia and industry are coming together to 
drive a new research agenda in trustworthy AI.  We are upping the ante on a holy grail! 
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